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# STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# SINGLE PORT MANAGEMENT: CRITICAL LINK IN THE RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION PROCESS

BY

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#### USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# Single Port Management, Critical Link in the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Process

Ву

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#### ABSTRACT

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In the post cold war era, our military is extremely dependent on joint strategic deployment assets to get our forces to the fight. Deployment operations need to be fully linked using the principles of Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSO&I). Today, more than ever, we need comprehensive, well thought-out plans that maximize the use of available assets, insuring that cargo flows through a water port as efficiently as possible.

Single port management doctrine will provide the continuity and the seamless transfer of cargo necessary to meet deployment missions. The doctrine on single port management is still evolving and not entirely written. With clearly defined responsibilities and accepted doctrine, our ability to support geographic commanders greatly improves. Only then we will have a seamless fort-to-foxhole joint logistics management process.

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"Orders to the chief commissary of the expedition were to load six months rations for 20,000 men. interest of haste, this amount is reduced to two months Then the quartermaster designed several vessels on each of which 100,000 rations were to be placed so that all would be assured of a reserve in case of separation. This amounted to some 5,000 tons of food; much had to be handled several times. stevedores became so exhausted that they would fall asleep wherever they happened to be whenever they were Similarly the, artillery pieces, carriages, ammunition arrived at different times different arsenals. The decision of the commanders that the guns should be mounted before loading, further delayed the operation."1

## The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953

The above statement is one brief example demonstrating the complexity of water port operations and the logistics of moving and supplying military forces during the Spanish American War. believe we have improved our logistics processes over the past 100 years, but I can still see the faces of exhausted commanders, stevedores, and port operators numbly trying to do their jobs during operations such as Desert Shield/Storm and countless other deployments. The commander above faced a multitude of issues from command and control, force movement, cargo projections, and port workforce which is all remarkably similar to what his modern day counterpart faces. His challenges are what Karl Von Clausewitz called the "frictions of war" in which many divergent actions converge at one point in an operation, in this case, the water port facility. Port operators and managers encounter similar challenges each time our country's leadership summons the military to support contingency operations. Volumes of lessons

learned stress the necessity of improving such logistics processes as gaining more intransit visibility (ITV) over items moving through the transportation system to maximizing dwindling resources to achieve the optimal flow of material into a theater of operation. Today, just as it was 100 years ago, our goal as port operators is ensuring efficient and effective seamless movement of personnel and material into a theater when and where a theater commander-in-chief (CINC) wants it.

Although much has been written about "just in time logistics" and we have made great leaps in automating our logistic process, we still encounter many commanders who undervalue the importance of logistics and its impact on success or failure of an operation. James A. Huston, author of The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953, perhaps put it best when he said, "logistics is nine-tenths of the business of war."

Today, more than ever, we need comprehensive, well thought-out plans that maximize the use of available assets, insuring that cargo flows through a port as efficiently as possible. Most planners agree that the time between initial arrival of cargo and personnel at a water port facility, and its operational employment, is probably the period of greatest vulnerability for the deploying unit.

In the post cold war era, our military is extremely dependent on joint strategic deployment assets to get our forces to the fight. Deployment operations now and in the future will be Joint, which makes command and control at water port facilities a complicated and sometimes cumbersome process.

This paper addresses concepts and issues surrounding command relationships during water port operations, specifically, "who runs the water port" for the geographic CINC during deployments. I focus on the two organizations, the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) and the 7<sup>th</sup> Transportation Group (Composite) and their relationship to water port operations and management.

In doing research for this paper, I found that there is much confusion and often frustration between key players in distinguishing the roles, missions, and organization of port operations and management during a deployment. Additionally, supported CINCs and their staffs are sometimes confused simply because they are not sure who should perform water port functions. If both MTMC and the 7<sup>th</sup> Transportation Group show up to work water port functions, they too have difficulties in articulating their specific roles and duties, which often become blurred and overlapping during a deployment. One thing is clear, both MTMC and the 7<sup>th</sup> Transportation Group are key players in the deployment process, each performing vital water port functions in support of the theater CINC.

To help clear up some of this confusion, this paper addresses the concept of "Single Port Management" as part of the overall process of Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSO&I) within a theater of operations. Ideas and issues

discussed are directed toward a "common user" water port facility as managed by Army personnel in support of contingency operations. I do not address any form of Joint or coalition water port operations or those instances where the Navy may be both the port operator and manager.

#### SINGLE PORT MANAGER

What is a Single Port Manager? According to the Department of Defense, a Single Port Manager is and agency or organization that: "performs those functions necessary to support the strategic flow of the deploying forces' equipment and sustainment supplies at the sealift port of embarkation (SPOE), and hand-off responsibility to the theater CINC in the sealift port of debarkation (SPOD)." Additionally, a single port manager provides the supported CINC with:

- strategic deployment status information such as cargo intransit visibility (ITV) and force closure estimates
- SPOD workload projections based on the supported CINC's priorities and guidance

The single port manager is responsible in performing the above functions through all phases of the theater port operations continuum, from a bare beach deployment to a commercial contractor supporting a deployment. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), through its transportation component command, MTMC, is the Department of Defense (DoD) designated single port manager for all common-user seaports worldwide.

MTMC also coordinates worldwide overland lift and traffic management for the movement of personnel and materiel.

USTRANSCOM has the added responsibility of being the lead agent for developing Joint doctrine on single port management. I will address the 7<sup>th</sup> Transportation Groups, role in water port operations as it relates to single port management latter in the paper.

The deployment process is broken down into various broad phases beginning with mobilization at home station, continuing with movement to an SPOE and SPOD, and finally movement to final assembly area. Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration process is part of the overall deployment process. Single port management is the critical link between the reception phase of the RSO&I process and all other phases. Reception is the first step in forces for the supported CINC. A sound reception plan is essential to a successfully deployment and without a solid plan, all other parts of the process breakdown and the operation is in jeopardy of success. To better understand the significance of port management, the RSO&I process needs some explanation.

#### RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION

The RSO&I process is not a new concept, but a way to address an old problem with a new name. Anyone who has participated in a unit deployment can appreciate the complexities of such a massive undertaking. From its earliest days, the Army has been concerned

with effectively deploying forces, receiving them in theater, and re-forming the forces into a cohesive combat team. For nearly half a century the Army focused on receiving forces and employing preposition equipment to defeat an enemy on the European continent. When the cold war ended, a new "internal war" on self-examination and re-engineering of our military strategy began. Power projection from a CONUS base became the fundamental foundation to our National Military Strategy. Today, success is measured by our ability to not only quickly project forces but on how well we receive personnel, materiel, and equipment; assemble these forces into units; move these units within the theater; and finally integrate this capability into a combat ready force. This process is collectively called RSO&I.

In 1995 Forces Command contracted the RAND Corporation to conduct an analysis of the RSO&I process. Their study revealed that there was little or no doctrine published that coherently tied together all aspects of the strategic deployment process. Since this study, there has been a ground swell of information, analysis, and recommendations on the criticality of RSO&I during deployment and employment of military forces. The RAND study focused on four main problem categories based on lessons learned from past deployment operations. Those categories were:

- RSO&I process takes too much time
- RSO&I providers supported larger populations than expected

- Force tracking and materiel distribution are recurring problems
- Command relationships are not clearly defined

Each category above, directly impacts on the manner in which seaports are operated and managed. The last item, command relationships, emphasizes the need for clear doctrine on who should manage and operate a common user seaport because the success or failure hinges on how well single port manager can satisfy all his customers and still meet the theaters CINC guidance. What complicates this issue even more, is the single port manger must satisfy a variety of organizations transiting a water port, all of which generally have different priorities, interests, and capabilities. If the single port manger is not responsive to the customer needs during the RSO&I process; the CINC will not meet his time-line for force closure. At this point a clear understanding of the basic RSO&I concepts, particularly the reception phase, becomes import in understanding its impact on water port management and operations.

#### RSO&I PROCESS

The RSO&I process is not logistics, but a phase of operations with heavy logistics implications. Units that approach RSO&I with the same intensity and methodology as combat operations tend to perform better than units that relegate RSO&I functions to the logistics staff. To be successful at RSO&I requires the same level of command emphasis, planning, rehearsal, synchronization

drills and attention to detail as other operations.<sup>5</sup> RSO&I consists of essential and interrelated processes in the area of operations which transform personnel and material into combat effect forces. RSO&I processes are:<sup>6</sup>

- Reception: process of unloading personnel and equipment from strategic or operational transport, marshalling local area transport and providing life support to the deploying personnel
- Staging: process of assembling, holding, and organizing arriving personnel and equipment into units and forces, incrementally building combat power and preparing units for onward movement
- Onward Movement: process of moving units and accompanying material from reception areas to tactical assembly areas; moving non-unit personnel and equipment from receptions facilities to distribution sites
- Integration: process of synchronizing the transfer of authority over units and forces to a designated component or functional commander for employment having achieved some key level of combat effectiveness

#### RSO&I PRINCIPLES

RSO&I encompasses a multitude of military functions. The Principles of War provide guidance to commanders on conducting

war. Similarly, the RSO&I process has four guiding principles. Each principle assists commanders and planners in the execution of RSO&I and become extremely important when organizing and executing water port operations. The four principles are Unity of Command, Unit Integrity, Logistics Footprint, and Managing the Flow. These principles and must be clearly understood by the deploying unit, the RSO&I providers, and joint commander (supported CINC).

• Unity of Command. Employing military forces in a manner that masses combat power to achieve a common objective is important at all levels of warfare. Unity of command as part of the RSO&I process, provides the necessary focus to accomplish effective and efficient building of combat power. organization needs to control and operate the entire RSO&I process. Having visibility over all aspects of the operation enables adjustment of critical resources based on deployment flow of equipment and personnel into the theater. supported CINC is responsible within his theater for RSO&I. He designates a functional support element to accomplish specific tasks at a particular location within the RSO&I area of operation. As an example, the single commander of a water port facility would be responsible for performing the necessary functions to support the strategic flow of deploying This commander would be responsible for providing deployment status in terms of the amount of equipment received and processed, port workload information that can be used to adjust resources, cargo ITV, and life support.

• Unit Integrity. Managing unit integrity during a large deployment is extremely important, but often difficult. Ideally, unit cargo and personnel should be on the same strategic/operational conveyance. However, more times than not, it is nearly impossible to keep unit integrity because of physical lift to scheduling decisions that are based on priorities set by the supported CINC. Our goal during any deployment operation should be within physical constraints to maintain as much unit integrity as possible.

Unit integrity provides distinct advantages to both the unit and force closure process by simplifying the force tracking, avoiding prolonged billeting and preventing loss or damage to equipment. Rapid and efficient organizing of the unit into a whole, mission capable component is the benchmark of a successful RSO&I operation.

Logistics Footprint. Determining the right size of the logistics footprint requires early and careful planning.

Defining the precise size of the logistics support structure relative to the size of the deploying force provides efficiency to the operation. Our goal is not to overburden the strategic lift, the support infrastructure, and the commander with more support than he needs. We need to deploy

the minimum support structure possible to maximize rapid throughput of units and materiel. Managing the Flow. The supported CINC's force closure objectives are critical to the success of an operation. The orderly and timely flow of personnel, equipment, and supplies into the theater must be orchestrated as part of the "whole" to achieve the mission. The CINC uses two processes to accomplish this portion of RSO&I; the effective use of Timed Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) and acquiring accurate, near real-time information (ITV) on the location and movement status of items moving through the system. With this information the water port commander can facilitate the time-sequenced flow while promoting unit integrity and reducing his logistics footprint.

The RSO&I process is a force multiplier that, if maximized and properly executed, can deliver ready forces to the supported CINC in the minimum amount of time. Using the RSO&I principles above, I will now focus on the initial step of reception, some lessons learned, and Roles and Responsibilities during water port operations.

#### RSO&I: RECEPTION

Reception is the off-loading of personnel and material from strategic lift assets at a point of debarkation for relocation to designated areas. Reception begins at the SPOD with the arrival of equipment and supplies on the first vessel. Reception ends when equipment is staged (the next step in the RSO&I process) and

unit personnel begin equipment linkup and preparation for onward movement.

As the initial step in the introduction of combat power to a theater, reception can determine the success or failure of an entire operation. 10 Any deployment operations can quickly derail if reception operations are not planned properly. This is especially true at a water port. Units arriving early or late, poor host nation coordination, lack of materiel handling equipment, insufficient storage space, vague command and control relations and many more challenges can all add up to disaster for the water port operator and manager. While reception plans vary from theater to theater, two things remain constant for port operators and mangers; reception capacity at an SPOD must equal or be greater than the planned strategic lift delivery capabilities and reception operations must be thoroughly planned and carefully executed. Historically, 85 to 90 percent of the unit equipment and sustainment cargo is moved by strategic sealift. With such an impact on the outcome of an contingency operation, efficient reception operations and management of the water port become extremely critical elements of success to the supported CINC.

Success at the water port begins with well thought out receptions plans. On the strategic level, success or failure at a water port facility directly impacts on our nations military

strategy. This point was emphasized in February 1996 when our National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement stated:

"To protect and advance U.S. interests in the face of the dangers and opportunities...the United States must deploy robust and flexible military forces that can accomplish a variety of tasks..."

Our National Security Strategy calls for the advancement of U.S. interests through an integrated policy of Shape, Respond, and Prepare. In order to support our national strategy, our military strategy established two objectives: promote peace and stability, and when necessary, defeat adversaries. Our armed forces have four strategic support concepts that accomplish our military strategy. They are strategic agility, oversea presence, power projection, and decisive force. In order for this strategy to work, the U.S. must be capable of rapidly deploying forces on short notice. One of the critical links in assuring success in a deployment is the effective management and operation of water terminals. The best way to exemplify the need for sound and effective water port operations is by looking at lessons learned form past deployments. I already mentioned the dilemma facing the water port commander during the Spanish American War, listed below are a few more examples stressing the importance for better port operations.

#### LESSONS LEARNED

Lessons learned provide a valuable tool in the critical analysis of how we can operate more effectively and efficiently.

As previously referred to, the RAND study listed many areas needing improvement during water port operations. Command relationship was one such area. Specifically command relationships were "not clearly defined" during RSO&I operations and that "who is in charge" became a question not easily answered. The Joint Force Commander (JFC) can not be distracted from his efforts of synchronizing deployment activities including water terminal management and must be addressed and resolved prior to deployment. Several examples demonstrating inefficiencies and confusion at a water terminal occurred during the initial phases of operation Desert Storm/Shield.

On 10 August 1990 an advanced party consisting of 300 soldiers from the 7<sup>th</sup> Transportation Group set up operations in Saudi Arabia beginning preparations for the reception of deploying forces. The 7<sup>th</sup> Group offloaded cargo and managed the SPOD even though its primary mission was transportation and port clearance operations and not port management operations. The 7<sup>th</sup> Group faced a multitude of problems from incomplete cargo records to lack of in-transit visibility. Most problems were outside the control of the 7<sup>th</sup> Group, however the Group was asked to perform tasks that were better suited for MTMC, an organization designed to perform water terminal management. MTMC gradually assumed responsibility of management of the SPOD freeing the 7<sup>th</sup> Group to discharge the ships, stage the equipment, and clear the port.

I am not suggesting that the 7<sup>th</sup> Transportation Group did not perform well during this operation. They, as well as all logisticians, did what was necessary to make the operation work. What I am stating is the JFC commander did not initially call upon the organization best suited to perform water terminal management. The reason why this happened can be attributed to a general lack of published joint doctrine and confusion on the part of the supported CINC's staff as to roles and missions of both MTMC and the 7<sup>th</sup> Transportation Group. Several more contingency operations reinforce my contention.

About a year after our experiences with Desert Storm/Shield, troops were deployed to Somalia on operation RESTORE HOPE and to Rwanda for the humanitarian relief operation, SUPPORT HOPE. In Somalia, the JFC initially assigned seaport operations to the Navy complicating the operation because the Army was the predominant deploying force. Later the Army assumed the water port operation and management mission. Shifting responsibility caused confusion and again drew questions as to "who was in charge" of seaport operations and on at least one occasion enabled the service with seaport control to give priority to its own requirements while other cargo was delayed.<sup>13</sup>

During SUPPORT HOPE, MTMC was ultimately called upon to perform a full range of seaport functions from planning to force reception and force re-deployment. It was a good example of

positive seaport control and reinforced the need for joint doctrine addressing single port management.

As a result of previous lessons learned, single port management continued to evolve with both the 7<sup>th</sup> Transportation Group and MTMC working toward a common understanding of roles and missions. In 1994 single port management again became an issue when U.S. forces deployed to southwest Asia in support of operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. MTMC conducted initial seaport planning and was among the first units deployed. Their responsibilities included documentation oversight, information management, and liaison with host nation agencies. Elements of 7<sup>th</sup> Transportation Group arrived and began port clearance, transportation services and staging operations. MTMC continued managing the port as the Group provided the seaport operational workforce. VIGILANT WARRIOR operations were an improvement in single port management, and although imperfect, in many ways set an example for how a water port should work.

Even though progress was made during VIGILANT WARRIOR, there were still some inconstancies in water port operations and management. The concept of single port management was not yet realized. In September 1994 MTMC deployed personnel to Haiti to manage water port operations in support of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. At about the same time MTMC personnel arrived, elements of the 7<sup>th</sup> Transportation Group were also deploying to Haiti for support operations. Seaport management responsibilities were split

between the two organizations. The lack of clear roles for seaport management and seaport operating forces resulted in a duplication of effort, competition for resources, and complicated relations between the organizations. 15

The lessons learned above depict a picture that the supported CINCs often times doesn't know who should be called to perform seaport operations. With little or no joint doctrine published, it appears that whatever unit arrives at the SPOD first, is responsible for SPOD operations.

#### WHO TO CALL

The confusion on which organization to call to work the SPOD can be partly explained by some basic organizational differences between MTMC and the 7<sup>th</sup> Transportation Group. MTMC is comprised primarily of civilians with military leadership. Like most units in the Army, MTMC has undergone drastic military personnel cuts both in the U.S. and overseas. As an example, from 1993 to 1995 MTMC Europe went from nearly 300 personnel to 73. These cuts were mostly military and host nation nationals at all level from Battalion Command to traffic management specialist. CINC Europe, who in the past could rely on the resources from MTMC to manage his ports, was now faced with a dilemma of going outside his area of operation seeking help from units he did not directly control. This often times added confusion as to who would work the water ports. MTMC recognized the impact of these reductions and reexamined how they would support European contingencies. The

common practice was/is to create a "Tiger Team" from assets across the European command because no one organization could support an operation and still continue with its day to day mission. A currently serving Battalion Commander became the team leader and the team deployed to the theater. On the surface, this appears to be nothing more than a normal task organization. In reality it was collection of individuals with varying skill levels and no habitual relationship other than being a member of MTMC. During contingencies soldiers performed extremely well under the most austere conditions, which is testament to their individual training and abilities. However, the fact that such a team never worked together as a unit and in most cases met for the first time as they arrived at the SPOD, doesn't portray confidence in the eyes of the supported CINC's staff.

Additionally, since MTMC is comprised mostly of civilians, unique challenges arose that needed to be addressed prior to deployment. Everything from what to wear to accounting for work hours placed additional burdens an operation. MTMC recognizes the challenges it faces and is working on programs to enhance the ability to deploy.

The 7<sup>th</sup> Transportation Group is organized with 4 Battalions, 15 companies and 13 detachments.<sup>16</sup> This organization habitually trains together for contingency operations. It is a rapid deploying unit that practices deployment as part of its mission. When called upon, the 7<sup>th</sup> Transportation Group task organizes

within itself to perform missions raging from rapid reception, multi-modal transportation operations and operating local line haul truck transportation. The advantages are clear; the 7<sup>th</sup> Group has an established chain of command, large work force, and is easily deployable. The most significant aspect is that the 7<sup>th</sup> Groups trains and works together on a daily basis.

It is clear that there are major differences between the two organizational structures and the manner in which they deploy. It is not difficult to understand why the 7th Transportation Group would perhaps be the "unit of choice" by a geographic CINC when contingencies arise. Without clear doctrinal and uniform guidance, geographic CINCs will continue to use whichever unit they perceive as providing the best support for their particular mission. This allows interpretation and analysis of who should manage and operate the water port facility that could be faulty particularly since the CINCs' staff may not know the roles and responsibilities of the 7th Group and MTMC. If we can overcome doctrinal challenges and clearly articulate in advance which organization a geographical CINC will call upon, we can greatly improve strategic deployments.

#### BRIDGING THE GAP

As indicated on the proceeding pages there is a need for consistency in the execution of seaport management responsibilities. Even within the transportation community, there is a general lack of common understanding of what seaport

management responsibilities are. In 1995, at the direction of USTRANSCOM, MTMC developed a document outlining port management responsibilities. The document titled, "Concept of Management and Operation of Strategic, Common-User Contingency Seaports (CONOPS)" was a coordinated effort between MTMC, the Chief of Transportation, and the 7th Transportation Group. The CONOPS purpose was to bridge the gap between MTMC and 7th Transportation Group by clearly defining port management roles and responsibilities. By taking this basic step, the transportation community was agreeing on a strategy of who will manage commonuser seaports. It moved the single port manager concept to the next level, creation of clear, concise doctrine for both the Army and helped the joint community understand the roles and missions of both 7th Transportation Group and MTMC.

#### ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

It is important to summarize some of the 14 key points of the single port management CONOPS to appreciate the complexity of this issue.

DoD Directive 5158.4, United States Transportation Command charges USTRANSCOM with the responsibility with providing"...air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense, both in time of peace and war." CINCTRANS further delegated to MTMC the responsibility as the single manager of seaport operations and capabilities. As such, MTMC was charged to perform the following:

• Participate in contingency plan development and analysis.

The inter-action between MTMC and the warfighting CINC becomes extremely important for integration of the RSO&I process into the contingency plan. It places command emphasis on the importance of receiving and processing equipment and personnel at a seaport. It also allows MTMC to advise the supported CINC on the size of the logistics footprint required to effectively operate a seaport.

 Establish liaison with host nation port authorities and develop contracts for stevedoring and related terminal services.

As DoD's seaport manager, MTMC has permanent presence in 25 seaports worldwide. 19 Their daily experience in working with host nation officials greatly enhances DoD's ability to deploy worldwide. This expertise provides a solid database of lessons learned that becomes extremely useful when new seaports are used for deployments. MTMC contract experience with acquiring stevedoring and related terminal services can reduce the need for military port personnel during contingencies, thus reducing the U.S. military logistics footprint at the seaport.

 Provide vessel discharge priorities, ship schedules and manifest data to port operators based on commander's intent.

Three areas of the RSO&I process are covered by the above responsibility. Unity of Command can be accomplished by

forecasting discharge requirements and scheduling vessels based on the warfighting CINC's priorities. Unit Integrity is maintained by keeping unit equipment and cargo in unit sets and controlling the loading and discharge of vessels by established priorities set by the CINC. Managing the flow of materiel into the theater by effective use of automated tool such as Worldwide Port System and Global Transportation Network provides the warfighting CINC with intransit visibility over his forces. This enables the CINC to predict his force closure and when he will be combat effective.

The responsibilities of the port operator e.g., the 7<sup>th</sup>
Transportation Group, is essentially to support RSO&I for joint
an or combined forces.<sup>20</sup> Their mission is to establish and
operate inland waterways, main supply routes, and operate theater
line haul truck transportation. Specifically their key roles at
the seaport are:

- Discharge and upload vessels
- Perform ship to shore cargo movement
- Perform cargo documentation for RSO&I of personnel,
   equipment, and supplies to provide intransit visibility
   to the supported CINC<sup>21</sup>

Since the 7<sup>th</sup> Transportation Group is an early deployer, it will, in all likelihood, be one of the first organizations at the seaport facility. Its primary role is to transform personnel and materiel into combat effect forces i.e., conduct RSO&I processes.

The port operator ensures the expeditious and well-documented transfer of deploying unit equipment into the theater of operations.<sup>22</sup>

As part of the overall concept of operations, MTMC, 7<sup>th</sup>
Transportation Group and Chief of Transportation agreed that a
deployable management cell would be formed and sent to the SPOD.
The management cell would consist of elements from USTRANSCOM,
MTMC, 7<sup>th</sup> Transportation Group, Military Sealift Command and
other elements as determined by the situation. Capabilities of
the management cell would include command and control,
communications, seaport preparation, and seaport management. In
order for this concept to work, the pre-selected individuals need
to train together as a unit, practicing every aspect of seaport
management. The single port manager concept, envisions MTMC as
the theater seaport manager through the use of management
cells.<sup>23</sup>

Understanding roles and responsibilities during seaport operations is only the first step in the process of effective seamless flow of equipment and supplies into a theater. However, doctrinal changes must take place both within the Army and the joint community if we are to capitalize on the RSO&I process, and single port management.

#### DOCTRINAL CHALLENGES

USTRANSCOM, as the Department of Defense's single worldwide manager for common user ports, believes there are several basic

tenets that will help alleviate doctrinal confusion on single port management. These tenets listed below, support the basic RSO&I principles of unity of command, unit integrity, logistics footprint and managing the flow of equipment and personnel.

- Contingency plans must reflect which organization will be the seaport manager for the geographic CINC. Early identification greatly enhances the deliberate planning process, insuring unity of command.
- Once the seaport managers are in place, they must remain constant so that any changes in operations are transparent to the supported CINC. Unit integrity at the seaport provides stability and continuity of effort.
- The supported CINC's movement requirements take precedence during contingency operations. Early identification of requirements enable the seaport operators to plan current operations, develop and pass workload instructions, and forecast future workload operations.
- Knowing where unit cargo is in the transportation system (intransit visibility, ITV) is paramount in projecting force closure for the geographic CINC. Without force closure, the CINC can not perform his mission. ITV enables the seaport manager to determine his logistics footprint and to adjust his workforce to accommodate projected workload.

- Geographic CINCs must program as part of their deployment plans early arrival of seaport managers and operators. This is often difficult to do since the CINC is focused on building combat power as quickly as possible and may not want to give up aircraft space to support personnel.<sup>24</sup>
- Joint training on seaport management and operations must be developed and practiced.

Perhaps the most significant item on developing the doctrine above, is the last one on joint training. In December 1997, USTRANSCOM stood-up the Joint Deployment Training Center (JDTC) at Fort Eustis Virginia. The JDTC's mission is to "develop and provide standardized joint deployment and common transportation doctrine, core curriculum, education and training for the Department of Defense, ensuring effective and efficient joint deployment and transportation support to the warfighting CINCs."25 The JDTC will devote a portion of its curriculum to the management and operation of seaports during contingencies. They will use the principles of RSO&I, integrating the process at all levels of the deployment spectrum from unit to theater. More importantly, the JDTC will further concepts such as single port management ensuring that all joint deployment doctrine is tied together for a common purpose. The JDTC envisions that it will evolve into both a resident course and a distance learning course that will allow anyone involved in the deployment process to quickly access deployment doctrine. The JDTC is best chance for

the for the single port management concept to be integrated into the joint doctrine.

#### CONCLUSION

"For the discharge of supplies and equipment the Army was left to its own resources. To get the animals ashore the simple expedient was to open the side hatches, push them into the water, and let them swim for it. Fifty of the 450 mules were lost when they turned the wrong way and swam out to sea."<sup>26</sup>

# The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953

The above quote from the Spanish American war indicates some unique challenges and even more creative solutions on seaport management. The road form these early days to a concept of single port management has been long and full of lessons learned. Seaport management is critical to the success of a military operation since the preponderance of unit equipment and sustainment cargo (approximately 85 to 95 percent) is moved by Effective seaport management is absolutely vital to sealift. The single port deploying and sustaining the joint force. management concept continues to evolve and change as new and more innovative ways to perform logistic functions emerge. We must continue to re-examine old business practices and be flexible enough to adapt our management techniques to a changing environment. Even with all our best efforts, seaport management and operations will not be flawless. However, with clearly defined responsibilities and accepted joint doctrine, our ability to support the geographic CINCs are greatly improved. We must

continue to train individuals in all aspects of seaport management and deployment activities. Only then we will have a seamless fort-to-foxhole joint logistics management process.

WORD COUNT: 5910

#### END NOTES

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